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PROPERTY LAW
L. Charles Long, Jr.*
Gina M. Burgin**
Pamela B. Beckner***
I. INTRODUCTION
This article reviews selected judicial decisions and legislation
affecting real property law in Virginia during the past year.
Part I discusses some of the more significant cases decided by
the Supreme Court of Virginia. Part II discusses some of this
year's most significant legislation enacted by the Virginia Gen-
eral Assembly.
II. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. Agency
In Reistroffer v. Person,' the Supreme Court of Virginia ex-
amined the question of agency vel nom in connection with an
alleged breach of a real estate sales contract. Jon and Linda
Reistroffer (Sellers) owned property in Prince William County
which was subject to the Virginia Property Owners' Association
Act.2 After retaining John Ehlinger, a realtor, to sell the prop-
erty for them, the Sellers and Lyndia Person (Buyer) executed a
contract which, among other things, confirmed that Ehlinger
* Shareholder, Hirschler, Fleischer, Weinberg, Cox & Allen, Richmond, Virginia;
BAL, 1960, Princeton University; J.D., 1963, School of Law, Harvard University.
** Associate, Hirschler, Fleischer, Weinberg, Cox & Allen, Richmond, Virginia;
BA, 1987, George Washington University; J.D., 1992, Columbus School of Law, Cath-
olic University of America.
*** Associate, Hirschler, Fleischer, Weinberg, Cox & Allen, Richmond, Virginia;
BA, 1976, Salem College; M.S.W., 1983, Virginia Commonwealth University; J.D.,
1983, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond.
1. 247 Va. 45, 439 S.E.2d 376 (1994).
2. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-508 to -516.2 (Repl. Vol. 1994).
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was the Sellers' agent.3 The Buyer directed in writing that the
homeowners' association disclosure packet be delivered to
Ehlinger on her behalf.4 Upon Ehlinger's timely receipt of the
documents, he informed the Buyer that the packet was avail-
able; however, the Buyer did not pick up the documents for
three months.5 Two days after having picked up the package,
the Buyer notified the Sellers that she was cancelling the con-
tract.6
The Sellers argued that, since the Buyer designated Ehlinger
as her agent for purposes of receiving the packet, the statutory
three-day period for reviewing the packet had long since ex-
pired when the Buyer gave notice of cancellation.! The Buyer
argued that Ehlinger was not her agent and, therefore, her
notice of cancellation was timely.8 The Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia concluded that the issue of whether an agency relation-
ship exists is one of fact to be resolved by the fact finder.9 As
such, the court reversed the trial court's judgment and remand-
ed the case for an evidentiary hearing on the agency issue.' °
B. Dedication
In E.S. Chappell & Son, Inc. v. Brooks," the Supreme Court
of Virginia was asked to determine whether the Commonwealth
effectively accepted the dedication of land for public-road pur-
poses. In 1966, William W. and Mary B. Campbell, Jay and
Judson T. Vaughan, Jr., and Hugh and Sally P. Campbell (col-
3. 247 Va. at 46-47, 439 S.E.2d at 377.
4. Id. at 47, 439 S.E.2d at 378.
5. Id.
6. Id. The court stated that "Paragraph 14 [of the Contract] is consistent with
Code § 55-511 (C), which provides, in pertinent part, that '[tihe purchaser may cancel
the contract . . . (ii) within three days after receiving the association disclosure pack-
et if the association packet . . . is hand delivered." Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 48, 439 S.E.2d at 378.
10. Id. at 48-49, 439 S.E.2d at 378-79. The Court further rejected the Sellers'
contention that they should be granted relief because the Buyer cancelled the contract
for a "non-HOA related reason". Id. In addition, the Court opined that it was clear
that the parties intended that the provision regarding attorney's fees would be sever-
able and would remain in effect if the Buyer was successful in the litigation. Id. at
49, 439 S.E.2d at 379.
11. 248 Va. 571, 450 S.E.2d 156 (1994).
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lectively, the "Campbells" and the "Vaughans") deeded and
dedicated to the Commonwealth one Fifty-Foot Strip of land
adjacent to U.S. Route 301 (the North-South Strip) and a sec-
ond Fifty-Foot Strip of land which ran east and west between
two lots (the Fifty-Foot Strip).' The Campbells and the
Vaughans subsequently conveyed the Fifty-Foot Strip to Virgin-
ia Tractor Company, Inc. and granted a non-exclusive easement
over the private road constructed on the North-South Strip. 3
The deed recited, however, that if the Commonwealth accepted
either the North-South Strip or the Fifty-Foot Strip as a public
road, Virginia Tractor would execute any instruments necessary
to effect the transfer."
Although the Commonwealth took the North-South Strip into
the secondary road system, the Fifty-Foot Strip was never made
a public road. 5 In 1983, E.S. Chappell & Son, Inc. (Chappell)
purchased several acres of land from Virginia Tractor, which
included the Fifty-Foot Strip. 6 After an adjacent property own-
er took control of the Fifty-Foot Strip, Chappell filed a motion
for judgment seeking to eject the adjacent property owner. 7
The trial court dismissed Chappell's suit, however, holding that
the Commonwealth had legal title to the Fifty-Foot Strip under
the doctrine of implied acceptance."8
The Supreme Court of Virginia found the trial court's reli-
ance on the implied acceptance doctrine erroneous for two rea-
sons. First, until public acceptance, dedication is merely an
offer to dedicate, revocable at the will of the landowner.' Sec-
12. Id. at 572, 450 S.E.2d at 157.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 572-73, 450 S.E.2d at 157.
15. Id. at 573, 450 S.E.2d at 157.
16. Id. The adjacent property owner undertook control over the strip by acts not
specified in the record. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. The doctrine of implied acceptance provides that
[Wihere a governing body has accepted part of the streets appearing on a
recorded plat and no intention to limit the acceptance is shown, such
partial acceptance constitutes acceptance of all the streets, provided the
part accepted is sufficiently substantial to evince an intent to accept the
comprehensive scheme of public use reflected in the plat.
Ocean Island Inn v. City of Virginia Beach, 216 Va. 474, 479, 220 S.E.2d 247, 252
(1975).
19. Chappell, 248 Va. at 573, 450 S.E.2d at 157 (citing Brown v. Tazewell County
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ond, the doctrine of implied acceptance only applies in urban
areas, and since the record was silent as to the urban or rural
nature of the Fifty-Foot Strip, the Commonwealth failed to
meet the burden of proof necessary to support a finding of im-
plied acceptance. °
C. Deeds
Carstensen v. Chrisland Corp.2 involved a "dispute over
whether a pipestem driveway shared by the owners of two
adjacent lots and located on their land, is subject to an ease-
ment for the benefit of a third adjacent lot owner."22 In early
1988, Chrisland Corporation, a developer and builder, contract-
ed to sell lots 25 and 26 of its Walnut Hill Subdivision to Alvin
and Marie Carstensen and Shirley O'Neil, respectively.' Set-
tlement on both lots occurred in June of 1989, with First
American Title Insurance Company issuing title insurance poli-
cies to both purchasers.24 A pipestem driveway was located on
a portion of both lots 25 and 26 and was in front of and adja-
cent to lot 27, which was subsequently purchased by Patricia
Kelly and David Daniel.25 No easement had been recorded
which permitted the owner of lot 27 access over the driveway,
and O'Neil and the Carstensens refused Chrisland's request for
an easement.2' As a condition to First American issuing a poli-
cy insuring Kelly and Daniel's title to lot 27, First American re-
quired Kelly and Daniel to execute an acknowledgment stating
that lot 27 might not have vehicular access to a public right-of-
way.2 7
Water and Sewer Auth., 226 Va. 125, 129, 306 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1983)).
20. Id. at 574, 450 S.E.2d at 158 (relying on Burks Bros. v. Jones, 232 Va. 238,
248, 349 S.E.2d 134, 141 (1986) (holding that a formal acceptance or express asser-
tion of dominion over a road by a public authority is required before dedication of a
rural road is complete)).
21. 247 Va. 433, 442 S.E.2d 660 (1994).
22. Id. at 436, 442 S.E.2d at 661.
23. Id. at 436, 442 S.E.2d at 662.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. As a result, Chrisland recorded a declaration of common driveway ease-
ment pursuant to Paragraph six of the Carstensen and O'Neil contracts, which re-
served the right to create easements which benefit the property or the community of
which it is a part. Id. at 437, 442 S.E.2d at 662.
27. Id.
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Chrisland, Kelly and Daniel filed a bill of complaint seeking
a judgment declaring that lots 25 and 26 were subject to an
easement in favor of lot 27.28 The trial court granted
"Chrisland's summary judgment motion, found an easement by
necessity and an easement by contract in favor .of lot 27 over
lots 25 and 26," and denied O'Neil and Carstensen's "motion for
summary judgment seeking to vacate the easement recorded by
Chrisland."29 The Supreme Court of Virginia noted that a mo-
tion for summary judgment is appropriate where there are no
material facts in dispute." Because the record fell short of
showing undisputed evidence of the elements required to estab-
lish an easement by necessity and material facts were in dis-
pute, the court found that the trial court erred in sustaining
Chrisland's motion for summary judgment and in finding an
easement by necessity.3'
The primary issue on appeal in Langman v. Alumni Associa-
tion of the University of Virginia" was whether a deed con-
taining a mortgage assumption clause was repudiated by the
grantee. In December 1986, Dr. Margaretha Langman and
Caleb Stowe signed a deed as grantors conveying to the Alumni
Association of the University of Virginia (the Alumni Associa-
tion) property known as "Ferdinand's Arcade" and located in
28. Id. ONeil and Carstensen filed a cross bill of complaint against Chrisland
alleging a claim of intentional interference with their contracts with First American
and a third party bill of complaint against First American charging that the company
breached its fiduciary duty to them, breached the contracts of title insurance, refused
to defend the litigation in bad faith, and engaged in legal malpractice. Id.
29. Id. at 437, 442 S.E.2d at 662-63. First American's motion for summary judg-
ment responding to charges of breach of contract and bad faith denial of representa-
tion was also granted by the trial court. As to the issues of fiduciary duty and legal
malpractice against First American and tortious interference with contract against
Chrisland, the trial court granted First American and Chrisland's motions to strike
and dismiss the case. Id.
30. Id. at 438, 442 S.E.2d at 663 (citing Stone v. Alley, 240 Va. 162, 163, 392
S.E.2d 486, 487 (1990)).
31. Id. at 439, 442 S.E.2d at 664. As to the claims against First American, the
court held that whether an easement ultimately was established by contract or by
necessity, the title insurance policies' exclusions would deny coverage for any losses
sustained as a result of any easement established. There being no coverage, the court
affirmed the trial court's holding that First American did not breach its contracts of
title insurance when it denied coverage and refused to provide a defense to the
claims. Id.
32. 247 Va. 491, 442 S.E.2d 669 (1994).
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Allegheny County, Maryland.33 The deed stated that the prop-
erty was subject to a $600,000 first deed of trust in favor of Do-
minion and Federal Savings & Loan Association (Dominion),
and that "[t]he Grantee does hereby assume payment of such
obligation and agrees to hold the Grantors harmless from fur-
ther liability on such obligation."' The deed was not signed by
a representative of the Alumni Association, nor was there a
space for a grantee's signature. 5
Gilbert Sullivan, Director of the Alumni Association, wrote to
Langman and Stowe acknowledging the gift represented by the
deed.36 An attorney for the Alumni Association, on Sullivan's
instructions, had the deed recorded. 7 In addition, Alumni As-
sociation financial statements for the fiscal years ending June
30, 1987 and 1988 identified the Dominion mortgage as a liabil-
ity and footnotes thereto stated that the Alumni Association
had "assumed the mortgage on property donated."38
The Alumni Association agreed to let Stowe collect the rents
and manage the property.39 The operating expenses and the
mortgage debt were paid out of the property's income during
1987; however, the expenses soon exceeded the revenues, and
Trustbank, the successor to Dominion, notified Langman that
the $600,000 note was in default.' Langman demanded that
the Alumni Association make the payments, but the Alumni
Association disclaimed any responsibility.4' Langman paid the
amount demanded and filed suit against the Alumni Associa-
tion.4
2
The Supreme Court of Virginia determined that the "lan-
guage in the deed providing that the Alumni Association, as
grantee, does hereby assume payment of [the Dominion note]
and agrees to hold the Grantors harmless from further liability
33. Id. at 494, 442 S.E.2d at 671-72.
34. Id. at 495, 442 S.E.2d at 672.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 495-96, 442 S.E.2d at 672-73.
39. Id. at 496, 442 S.E.2d at 673.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 497, 442 S.E.2d at 673.
42. Id.
1136
on such obligation is clear, unambiguous, and explicit."' The
court determined that in such a case one should not look fur-
ther than the four corners of the instrument under review."
The court found no ambiguity in the deed, stating that the
terms of the deed show that "the grantor intended to transfer
her entire interest in the property to the Alumni Associa-
tion."
On the issue of the acceptance of the deed, the court stated
that "whether a grantee has accepted a deed is not determined
by the presence or absence of the grantee's signature on the
deed, but by factual evidence of the grantee's actions tending to
prove either acceptance or renunciation of the conveyance."46
The court determined that during the thirty-month period from
the date of the deed until the controversy began, "the Alumni
Association took no actions to resist the passage of title or to
repudiate either the gift of the property or the debt connected
with it."4' The court held that the evidence did "not support
the trial court's finding that the Alumni Association timely
disavowed the deed;" therefore, having accepted the conveyance,
the Alumni Association was bound by the terms of the deed.'
D. Easements
The issues on appeal in Fairfax County Park Authority v.
Atkisson" were whether, upon remand, the evidence supported
the chancellor's finding that the plaintiffs owned an interest in
a cemetery so as to be entitled to an access easement and
whether the chancellor had the authority to require the Fairfax
County Park Authority (the Authority) to relocate an express
easement on land owned by the Authority that was never bur-
dened by the easement." George and Carlotta Atkisson filed a
bill of complaint against the Authority, Wexford Associates,
43. Id. at 498, 442 S.E.2d at 674.
44. Id. at 498-99, 442 S.E.2d at 674 (citing Trailsend Land Co. v. Virginia Hold-
ing Corp., 228 Va. 319, 325, 321 S.E.2d 667, 670 (1984)).
45. Id. at 499, 442 S.E.2d at 675.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 500, 442 S.E.2d at 675.
48. Id. at 501, 442 S.E.2d at 676.
49. 248 Va. 142, 445 S.E.2d 101 (1994).
50. Id. at 143, 445 S.E.2d at 102.
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Inc., and fifty-six owners of lots located in the Wendover Subdi-
vision, alleging ownership of a property interest in an easement
that provided ingress and egress to their family cemetery.5
The trial court granted the defendants' demurrer to the bill
of complaint.52 The Supreme Court of Virginia awarded the
Atkissons an appeal and remanded the case to the trial court
for further proceedings.53 Upon remand, the chancellor held
that the Atkissons had an express easement granting them
access to the cemetery and ordered the Authority to construct a
new easement on land owned by the Authority.' The Supreme
Court of Virginia awarded the Authority an appeal.55
The Authority argued that the Atkissons did not own an
express easement since they "failed to establish at trial their
ownership of the dominant estate to which the access easement
was appurtenant.""5 The Atkissons argued that "the chancellor
could infer that they had an ownership interest in the cemetery
that is a part of the dominant estate."57 The Supreme Court of
Virginia rejected the Authority's argument, relying partly upon
the language of a 1978 deed.58 The court further held that the
chancellor could not change the location of the easement and
encumber Authority property that had never been part of the
servient estate.59
51. Id. at 143-44, 445 S.E.2d at 102.
52. Id. at 144, 445 S.E.2d at 102.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 146, 445 S.E.2d at 103.
57. Id. By deed in 1892, Mr. Atkisson's aunt conveyed a fifteen-acre parcel to
Thomas Adams, Mr. Atkisson's grandfather. The deed created an express fifteen-foot
right-of-way from the fifteen-acre parcel to a public road. As a result of an 1896
partition suit decree, Mr. Adams also owned other property that adjoined the fifteen-
acre parcel. The cemetery lot is located on either or both of these properties. Id. at
145, 445 S.E.2d at 103. By deed dated March, 1978, the Adams' heirs conveyed their
interest in the property to Harold Miller, trustee. Miller subsequently conveyed his
interest in the land, without exception, to the land development company, which sub-
sequently conveyed its interest in the property to the partnerships that subdivided
the land and created the subdivision. Id.
58. The 1978 deed conveyed the entire parcel, except the cemetery, subject to all
easements, restrictions and rights of way of record. Id. at 147, 445 S.E.2d at 104.
59. Id. at 148, 445 S.E.2d at 105; see Eureka Land Co. v. Watts, 119 Va. 506, 89
S.E.2d 968 (1916). In Eureka Land Co., the court rejected Eureka's contention that
there had never been a specific location of the right-of-way provided for in the deeds
and held, "[w]hen a way is once located, it cannot be changed by either party without
1138
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The court remanded the case to the chancellor with directions
to enter an order requiring the defendants to provide a mutual-
ly agreeable easement at their expense for the Atkissons or to
remove any obstructions that interfere with the Atkissons' use
of the original express easement. 0
In Knewstep v. Jackson,6 the Supreme Court of Virginia
examined whether the trial court erred in establishing and
locating a right-of-way easement. In 1977, George Holladay ac-
quired a 176.38-acre tract of land known as Red Rock Farm
and located in Orange County.62 In 1980, Holladay and his
wife conveyed 4.976 acres of the tract to Russell and Frances
Barbee.63 A plat of survey attached to the deed showed a
pipestem at the tract's northwest corner which did not touch
any portion of State Route 673.4 In 1984, the Barbees con-
veyed the tract and a .0474-acre parcel to Alan Knewstep, III
and Judy Ann Knewstep, his wife.6" The .0474-acre parcel pro-
vided a "bridge" from the northern end of the pipestem on the
thirty-foot right-of-way to State Route 673.66 In 1986, the
Holladays conveyed three acres of Red Rock Farm with a "non-
exclusive easement and right-of-way thirty (30) feet in
width... to State Secondary Route 673" to Charles and Nancy
Jackson and Henry Boston. 7 The plat attached to the deed
showed that the thirty-foot right-of-way terminated at State
Route 673; however, undisputed evidence established that the
pipestem, including the thirty-foot right-of-way, did not touch
any portion of State Route 673.65
the consent of the other." Id. at 509, 89 S.E.2d at 970.
60. Atkisson, 248 Va. at 149, 445 S.E.2d at 105.
61. 248 Va. 300, 448 S.E.2d 609 (1994).
62. Id. at 301, 448 S.E.2d at 609.
63. Id.
64. The 1980 deed provided as follows:
The property conveyed hereby is conveyed subject to a non-exclusive 30'
right-of-way leading from Virginia State Route 673 along the line of
Grimsby and Peyton, as shown on said plat, which said non-exclusive
right-of-way is hereby reserved for the benefit of the residue of the prop-
erty retained by the [Holladays].
Id. at 301, 448 S.E.2d at 610.
65. Id. at 302, 448 S.E.2d at 610.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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Notwithstanding a finding that the Holladays never had an
easement of record to State Route 673, the commissioner in
chancery held that the Holladays reserved a right-of-way "from
Route 673.""9 The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the trial
court and entered a final judgment in favor of the Knewsteps,
holding that the lower court's conclusion was contrary to estab-
lished law and undisputed evidence."0
In Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. of Va. v. Properties
One, Inc., 1 the Supreme Court of Virginia considered two is-
sues regarding damage to telephone equipment owned by the
Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Company (C & P): "(i)
Whether a 1904 agreement between C & P's predecessor in
interest, Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company
("Southern Bell") and I. Cohen and S. Cohen (collectively, "Co-
hen"), predecessors in interest to Properties One, Inc. ("Proper-
ties"), obligated Properties to pay for the damages to C & P's
property; and (ii) whether the trial court erred in granting
Properties' motion to strike C & P's evidence of negligence." 2
In 1904, Cohen, wishing to extend an existing building in the
City of Richmond over a public alley, beneath which ran cables
owned by Southern Bell, entered into a written agreement with
Southern Bell in which Cohen stipulated that, if its future use
of the alley interfered with Southern Bell's equipment, Cohen
would make Southern Bell whole.7"
After acquiring the property from Cohen in 1989, Properties
hired two independent contractors to perform demolition and
excavation work on the property which resulted in damage to C
& P's cables. 4 C & P sued Properties under the 1904 agree-
ment, alleging that Properties was liable for the contractors'
negligence and that Properties, by virtue of its successor owner-
ship, had agreed to indemnify C & P for any and all costs in-
curred as a result of damage to C & P's property."5 The trial
69. The trial court concluded that the Holladays did not intend to reserve an
easement of right-of-way to nowhere. Id.
70. Id. at 303, 448 S.E.2d at 611.
71. 247 Va. 136, 439 S.E.2d 369 (1994).
72. Id. at 137-38, 439 S.E.2d at 370.
73. Id. at 138, 439 S.E.2d at 370.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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court granted Properties' motion for summary judgment on the
indemnification issue and entered judgment on the negligence
issue in favor of Properties.76
The Supreme Court of Virginia, holding that an easement
had not been created by the 1904 agreement, noted that "the
intention to grant an easement must be so manifest on the face
of the instrument that no other construction can be placed on
it."" Because the 1904 agreement did not manifest a clear
intent to create an easement for Cohen's benefit, the court con-
cluded that the agreement imposed liability on Cohen and its
successors in interest only for Cohen's acts, not for acts of
Cohen's successors in interest."
Relying on the well-established rule of employer liability set
forth in Kesler v. Allen,7 9 the court also held that Properties
could not be rendered vicariously liable for its contractors' fail-
ure to comply with the provisions of the "Miss Utility" notifica-
tion statute.0
In Cooper v. Kolberg8 ' the Supreme Court of Virginia consid-
ered the issue of encroachment on an easement. Benjamin Coo-
per, HI and members of his family, owners of a one-acre tract
abutting an easement, sued William and Martha Kolberg (the
Kolbergs), owners of the adjoining 1.064 acres, seeking the
following: (1) a mandatory injunction requiring the Kolbergs to
remove a wire cable fence they had erected across a portion of
the shore land abutting the Coopers' property; and (2) a per-
76. Id. at 138, 439 S.E.2d at 371.
77. Id. at 139, 439 S.E.2d at 370 (citing Corbett v. Rueben, 223 Va. 468, 471, 290
S.E.2d 847, 849 (1982)).
78. Id. at 140, 439 S.E.2d at 371.
79. 233 Va. 130, 353 S.E.2d 777 (1987). The Kesler court stated:
As a general rule, an owner who employs an independent contractor is
not liable for injuries to third persons caused by the contractor's negli-
gence. Exceptions exist, and the doctrine of respondeat superior may
become applicable, if the independent contractor's torts arise directly out
of his use of a dangerous instrumentality, arise out of work that is in-
herently dangerous, are wrongful per se, are a nuisance, or are such that
it would in the natural course of events produce injury unless special
precautions were taken.
Id. at 134, 353 S.E.2d at 780.
80. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 247 Va. at 141, 439 S.E.2d at 372.
81. 247 Va. 341, 442 S.E.2d 639 (1994).
1995] 1141
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:1131
manent injunction against the Kolbergs' future obstruction of
the Coopers' access to the waters of Lake Anna. 2
In 1968, Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO)
acquired from Edna Broaddus Johnson and her children 142.36
acres of land on the north side of the North Anna River." The
Johnsons' deed to VEPCO reserved an easement over a strip of
land of varying width between the water line of Lake Anna and
the new line of the Johnsons' property (the shore land)" in the
Johnsons' favor, subject to VEPCO's regulatory requirements.
In 1971, the Johnsons conveyed a 4.5315-acre tract to John
and Stacie Zugschwert, from which the Coopers ultimately were
conveyed a one-acre parcel with the exclusive right, except as
provided in the conveyance of the shore land to VEPCO, to
enter upon, occupy and use the shore land for recreation and
agricultural purposes.85 The Johnsons later conveyed to the
Zugschwerts a second tract containing 5.936 acres, which tract
the Zugschwerts conveyed to the Kolbergs in 1977.86
The court stated that "[t]he successors to the possession of
the divided parts will be entitled to benefits substantially pro-
portional to the benefits the original possessor could realize
from those parts while he held them all in a single posses-
sion.18 7 Therefore, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the
following findings of the trial court: (1) the character and na-
ture of the easement precluded nonexclusive use of the whole
by all of the owners of the abutting land; (2) the instruments in
the parties' chains of title indicated that a nonexclusive joint
use of the shore land had not been contemplated; and, (3) ap-
82. Id. at 342-43, 442 S.E.2d at 640.
83. Id. at 343, 442 S.E.2d at 640.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 344, 442 S.E.2d at 641.
86. Id. The deed from the Zugschwerts to the Kolbergs contained the following
provision:
The [Zugschwerts] specifically convey all rights, title and interest in the
easement mentioned in the deed ... between [the Johnsons and
VEPCO].... It is the intent of the [Zugschwerts] that the easement of
the previously conveyed adjoining property be divided from the 734.6'
iron pin found to the nearest point of water.
Id. at 345, 442 S.E.2d at 641.
87. Id. at 349, 442 S.E.2d at 644 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 488 cmt.
d (1944)).
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portionment was the "appropriate solution to the problem posed
in this case."88
E. Eminent Domain
In Lynch v. Commonwealth Transportation Commissioner,89
the Supreme Court of Virginia decided "whether the trial court
erred in excluding certain exhibits and testimony that, accord-
ing to a landowner, would have demonstrated the highest and
best use of his property for purposes of proving the value of
[h]is land.. . ."" After an unsuccessful attempt to purchase a
9.358-acre tract from Edwin W. Lynch, Jr., the Commonwealth
Transportation Commissioner (the Commissioner) recorded a
certificate of take to acquire possession of the property.9' A
panel of commissioners fixed the value of the land taken at
$740,000.00 and found that Lynch's remaining land was not
damaged by the taking.9 2 Sixteen months prior to the taking,
Lynch had filed a rezoning application seeking to have his land
rezoned from residential to general industrial." Since approval
of the application was a virtual certainty, Lynch made plans to
develop his land as an office/industrial park.94
At trial, the lower court barred several of Lynch's exhibits,
explaining that the exhibits sought to prove the frustration of
speculative plans for future use of the property." The court,
likewise, barred the testimony of Lynch's expert real estate
appraiser and professional engineer, both of whom would have
testified about the impact of the taking on the residue of
Lynch's land.96
It is settled in Virginia that the measure of compensation for
property taken is the fair market value of the property at the
88. Id. at 347, 442 S.E.2d at 642.
89. 247 Va. 388, 442 S.E.2d 388 (1994).
90. Id. at 389, 442 S.E.2d at 388.
91. Id. at 390, 442 S.E.2d at 389.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. These plans were consistent with the recommendations of the Lorton-South
Route 1 Area Citizens' Task Force established by the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax
County. Id. at 390, 442 S.E.2d at 389.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 391, 442 S.E.2d at 389.
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time of the taking, given the "property's adaptability and suit-
ability for any legitimate purpose in light of conditions and
circumstances that exist at the time of the take or that reason-
ably may be expected in the near future." 7 Damages to land
remaining after a taking are "the difference in the residue's
value immediately before and immediately after the taking.""
"In determining such damages, consideration may be given to
every circumstance, present or future, that affects the residue's
value at the time of the take."99 The Supreme Court of Virgin-
ia ultimately found that the trial court erred in not allowing
Lynch's expert witnesses to testify and by disallowing the ex-
hibits, as the proffered evidence demonstrated the property's
potential, the adaptability and suitability of the property for its
highest and best use, and the impact of the taking on the re-
maining property.0 0
In Fairfax County Park Authority v. Virginia Department of
Transportation,0 ' the Supreme Court of Virginia assessed the
trial court's determination of the fair market value of con-
demned property which had use restrictions placed on it by a
trust agreement. "The trust agreement name[d] Fairfax County
Park Authority (FCPA) as the beneficiary in possession of the
trust property so long as the property was used as a public
park . . o2 If used for other purposes, ownership of the
property was to vest in a church.'0 ' In 1988, the Virginia De-
partment of Transportation (VDOT) filed a Certificate of Con-
demnation for several acres of the property to improve existing
roadways."' VDOT's appraisal witness testified that the value
97. Id. at 391, 442 S.E.2d at 389-90.
98. Id. at 391, 442 S.E.2d at 390.
99. Id.; see, e.g., Appalachian Elec. Power Co. v. Gorman, 191 Va. 344, 353, 61
S.E.2d 33, 37-38 (1950). In Gorman, the court held that land adaptable and suitable
for a "high-class" residential subdivision, platted into numerous lots and streets on a
plat that was prepared, but not developed, was properly admitted into evidence by
the trial court. The plat was determined "useful and material in illustrating how the
taking of the easement and the construction and operation of the power line changed
the present and immediate situation with respect to the development of the tract
and, thereby, affected both the present and immediate future of the entire tract." Id.
at 356-57, 61 S.E.2d at 39.
100. Lynch, 247 at 393-94, 442 S.E.2d at 391.
101. 247 Va. 259, 440 S.E.2d 610 (1994).
102. Id. at 260, 440 S.E.2d at 610.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 261, 440 S.E.2d at 611.
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of the property, if used as a park or an open space, was
$2,125.00 per acre." 5 The appraisal witness presented by
FCPA testified "that there was no market for park land and
therefore the property, if restricted to use as a park, had no
market value."' If used for residential purposes however, the
condemned property was estimated to have a market value of
$125,000.00 per acre.' °
Having never determined whether use restrictions such as
those present in this case should be applied in determining the
amount of a condemnation award, the Supreme Court of Virgin-
ia examined a series of cases in which railroad tax assessments
were challenged. 8 In those cases, the court held that the fair
market value of the land, not the value of the land to the own-
er, is subject to taxation."° The court further opined that the
market value of land is derived by considering the various uses
to which the land is susceptible, not those uses to which a
particular owner may be restricted."0 However, if land cannot
be put to another use economically, it is appropriate to take its
committed use into consideration when determining the market
value of such land."' Applying the principles stated in the
railroad cases, the court decided that the fair market value of
the property condemned in this case should have been calculat-
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 261, 440 S.E.2d at 612; see Richmond F. & P.R.R. v. State Corp.
Comm'n, 230 Va. 260, 336 S.E.2d 896 (1985); Richmond F. & P.R.R. v. State Corp.
Comm'n, 219 Va. 301, 274 S.E.2d 408 (1978); Richmond F. & P.R.R. v. Common-
wealth, 203 Va. 294, 124 S.E.2d 206 (1962). In these cases, R.F. & P. sought a re-
duction in the appraised value of land that could only be used as a railroad yard. As
in the instant case, part of the land was subject to an indenture agreement that pro-
vided that if the land was used for purposes other than maintenance or construction
of railroad tracks, ownership of the land would revert to the United States govern-
ment. This court rejected R.F. & P.'s argument that restricted use as a railroad yard
and the indenture agreement should be considered in determining the market value
of the property.
109. Fairfax County, 247 Va. at 262, 440 S.E.2d at 612.
110. Id.
111. Id.; see also Lake Monticello Serv. Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 237 Va. 434,
440-41, 377 S.E.2d 446, 450 (1989); Highway Conm'r v. Reynolds, 206 Va. 785, 788,
146 S.E.2d 261, 263 (1966); Richmond F. & P. R.R. v. Commonwealth, 203 Va. 294,
300, 124 S.E.2d 206, 210 (1962) (noting that condemnation is an in rem proceeding
and, while the land is valued from the point of view of an owner rather than the
condemnor, the value established is not the value to the owner personally).
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ed without regard to the use restrictions placed on it by the
trust agreement."2
F. Landlord and Tenant
In 1994, the Supreme Court of Virginia wrestled with three
cases involving landlord-tenant relationships.
In Drysdale v. Barco,"' the parties disputed whether a com-
mercial lease had been automatically extended for another year
at the "old" rental rate, or whether a writing from the landlord
to the tenant, sent subsequent to the termination date pre-
scribed in the lease but purporting to constitute a termination
notice, operated to terminate the lease, thus abrogating the
older, more favorable rental."4
In the earlier lease (the 1978 lease) the operative provision
stated:
The term of this lease shall be five years, commencing on
March 1, 1978, and terminating on February 28, 1983,
unless sooner terminated as herein provided. This lease
shall be deemed to be extended from the said termination for
one (1) year until February 28, 1984, and thereafter from
year to year unless and until either of the parties hereto
notifies the other in writing, at least three (3) months prior
to the expiration of this lease or of one of the subsequent
annual renewal periods, of the desire of the party giving
such notice to terminate the lease as of the expiration of
the then current term."'
112. Fairfax County, 247 Va. at 263, 440 S.E.2d at 613.
113. 247 Va. 350, 442 S.E.2d 648 (1994).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 351-52, 442 S.E.2d at 649 (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court of
Virginia then quoted from its decision in Harmon v. Howe, 68 Va. (27 Gratt.) 676
(1876):
Nothing is more common than the omission of words, and even most
important words, in drawing written instruments; and yet those words
can, generally, be as well understood from the context of the instrument
as if they were expressed in it, and the instrument is construed accord-
ingly. It would be a great defect in the law if this were not so.
Drysdale, 247 Va. at 354, 442 S.E.2d at 650.
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The 1987 lease omitted the italicized language in the paragraph
above and redefined the lease term.116
No termination notice was sent to Drysdale, the lessee, by
the time the initial term of the 1987 lease expired on December
31, 1989, and he continued in possession, paying the rental
specified for the initial term."7 In 1990, the landlord's interest
in the property and lease were acquired by Barco, who notified
Drysdale "that 'the month to month Lease of the premises' was
'terminated as of December 1, 1990' and that if Drysdale
wished to remain in possession," he must agree to a new, in-
creased rental." Drysdale contended that the lease had been
automatically extended through the calendar year 1991."'
The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with the lower court's
finding that the italicized language in the 1978 lease was omit-
ted inadvertently, as a scrivener's error, from the 1987 lease
and the 1987 lease should have been interpreted as if such
language were included.2 The court then turned to the lower
court's finding that the notice given by Barco to Drysdale was
sufficient to terminate the lease and held that, had the lower
court given proper effect to the missing language in the 1987
lease, it would have been apparent that the notice was deficient
and ineffective to terminate the lease prior to the end of the
1991 calendar year."
116. Drysdale, 247 Va. at 352, 442 S.E.2d at 649. The newer lease provided that:
The term of this lease shall be three years, commencing on January 1,
1987, and terminating on December 31, 1989, unless and until either of
the parties hereto notifies the other in writing at least three (3) months
prior to the expiration of this lease of the desire of the party giving such
notice to terminate the lease as of the expiration of the current term.
Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 352-54, 442 S.E.2d at 649-50 (citing Peyton v. Harmon, 63 Va. (22
Gratt.) 643 (1872), for the proposition that the law will not let contracts fail for am-
biguities, but rather will construe them to express the intention of the parties). The
Supreme Court of Virginia sanctioned the lower court's construction of the 1987 lease
as if the italicized language in the 1978 lease had been included. Id. at 355, 442
S.E.2d at 651.
121. Id. at 355, 442 S.E.2d at 651.
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:1131
In Safeway, Inc. v. Plaza Co., 2' Safeway's predecessor in
interest had leased a store site from Plaza Company's predeces-
sor in interest." The lease between Plaza Company and Safe-
way provided, in pertinent part, that:
[the] Lessor further agrees that . . . following completion of
construction of any portion of the shopping center, the sizes
and arrangements of... common areas (including parking
areas and traffic circulation and flow patterns) will not be
changed without lessee's written consent, and that... if
said sizes or arrangements are changed without lessee's
written consent, lessee may cancel this lease by notice to les-
sor.
124
However, Safeway never opened a store there, but instead left
the store unbuilt and paid the rent as required.'
Three years after initial construction of the center, the lessor
revealed to Safeway its plans to build an eight-screen movie
theatre in the center.2 Safeway objected, but the lessor built
the theatre at a loss of approximately fifty parking spaces.
Safeway then notified the lessor that it would pay no more
rent.
127
The lower court ruled in favor of the lessor in a suit to col-
lect rent, holding that the lease had not been cancellable as a
result of the parking space loss, as the loss did not constitute a
material breach of the lease." The Supreme Court of Virginia
reversed the lower court and entered final judgment for Safe-
way, stating that the facts spoke for themselves: the site plan
called for parking and for no other use there whatsoever, and
the parking was eliminated without Safeway's permis-
sion-indeed, in spite of Safeway's objection." 9
122. 248 Va. 1, 444 S.E.2d 544 (1994).
123. Id. at 2, 444 S.E.2d at 544.
124. Id. at 2-3, 444 S.E.2d at 544-45 (emphasis added).
125. Id. at 3, 444 S.E.2d at 545.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 4, 444 S.E.2d at 545. Safeway had argued that a showing of "material
breach" was unnecessary and that all it had to show was that the parking area had
been changed without its consent. Id.
129. Id. at 5, 444 S.E.2d at 546.
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In a third case involving a commercial lease, the Supreme
Court of Virginia decided the technical issue of whether a
lessor's earlier actions to recover unpaid rent barred a later
action to recover additional unpaid rent under the doctrine of
res judicata.30 In Aiglon Associates, Ltd. v. Allan,"3 ' the les-
sor, Aiglon, had recovered damages in general district court for
unpaid rent that accrued during the first three Eionths of a
lease, and later brought suit in circuit court to recover the
balance of rent due after the first three months. The lessee,
Allan, defended successfully below upon three claims: (1) the
general district court action was dispositive of the issue of un-
paid rent; (2) that the first suit should have disposed of all
claims related to unpaid rent; and (3) that the latter suit con-
stituted a "splitting" of Aiglon's causes of action respecting rent
which was barred by the earlier action by the doctrine of res
judicata."2
The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed, reversing the lower
court. The court first cited relevant sections of the lease, which
permitted the lessor, in the event of default, to reenter the
premises and to relet them." The court specifically stated
that such actions by the lessor shall not be considered as an
election on the part of the lessor to terminate the lease.M
The court noted that acceleration of rent in this case was only
mandatory upon termination of the lease, which had not oc-
curred."8 Finally, the court rejected the lessee's contention
that the lessor's filing of the lawsuit in general district court
somehow constituted a termination of the lease. 36
130. Aiglon Assocs. v. Allan, 248 Va. 150, 445 S.E.2d 138 (1994).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 151, 445 S.E.2d at 139.
133. Id. at 152, 445 S.E.2d at 139.
134. Id. at 152, 445 S.E.2d at 139-40. The Supreme Court of Virginia reasoned
that the lessee's reliance on Snyder v. Exuim, 227 Va. 373, 315 S.E.2d 216 (1984),
was inappropriate, because in Snyder it was clear that there was a mandatory accel-
eration of rent upon the lessee's default, which is not true in the instant case. Aiglon
Assocs., 248 Va. at 152, 445 S.E.2d at 139-40.
135. Aiglon Assocs., 248 Va. at 153, 445 S.E.2d at 140.
136. Id. at 153-54, 445 S.E.2d at 140.
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G. Purchases and Sales
In Firebaugh v. Hanback,37 the Supreme Court of Virginia
examined a number of questions arising out of a contract to
purchase and sell real estate in Augusta County. Firebaugh and
Lunsford ("Buyers") were real estate agents who contracted to
buy land for sale by their principals, Hanback and Richards,
Trustees for Ye Old Hunters Club (the Sellers)."' The Sellers
told the Buyers that the sale was an "as is" sale and that
whatever acreage was, in fact, owned by the Sellers was being
sold. The Sellers further stated that any contract contingent
upon there being a certain amount of acreage, or which contem-
plated a price reduction if acreage turned out to be substantial-
ly less than the approximately 126 acres that the Sellers
thought they owned, would be rejected and, indeed, had been
rejected by the Sellers." 9 The Buyers drafted an extension of
the listing agreement which did not accurately reflect the
Sellers' position on this point and inappropriately executed the
extension on behalf of the Sellers, without the Sellers' permis-
sion."' When a survey of the property revealed a 36.5-acre
deficiency, the Buyers sued to have the contract specifically en-
forced against the Sellers and the purchase price reduced due
to the lesser acreage.'
A commissioner in chancery held that the Buyers had
breached their fiduciary duties to the Sellers and, accordingly,
were not entitled to specifically enforce the contract against the
Sellers and that the Buyers were liable to the Sellers for the
costs involved.'
137. 247 Va. 519, 443 S.E.2d 134 (1994).
138. Id. at 522, 443 S.E.2d at 135.
139. Id. at 522-23, 443 S.E.2d at 135-36.
140. Id. at 523, 443 S.E.2d at 136. The executed real estate contract "defined the
term real property as . . . the land and all improvements . . . 126 acres, more or
less . . . in 'as is' condition. . . ." Id.
141. Id. at 524, 443 S.E.2d at 136. The Buyers interpreted the contract to mean
that the acreage had to be close to what the contract described but admitted that
they had not communicated their interpretation of the contract to the Sellers before
the contract was executed. Id.
142. Id. at 524, 443 S.E.2d at 137.
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After saluting a long line of cases for the proposition that, on
appeal, a commissioner in chancery's findings will be affirmed
'unless plainly wrong,'" the Supreme Court of Virginia like-
wise found that the Sellers intended to sell by the gross, not by
the acre, and the Buyers knew of this intention-at the same
time the Buyers were the Sellers' fiduciaries.' 4
The court then noted that, although a Virginia court of equi-
ty generally would award purchasers specific performance of
that portion of a contract that the seller was able to effectu-
ate,' there are a number of exceptions to the general
rule. The Supreme Court of Virginia held: (1) the record
clearly showed that the Buyers had breached their fiduciary
duty to the Sellers, thus forfeiting their standing to obtain
specific relief;' and (2) the award of costs to the Sellers was
within the discretion of the trial court.'
The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed claims of fraud,
misrepresentation and negligence related to the sale of a resi-
143. Id. at 525, 443 S-E.2d at 137 (citing Hill v. Hill, 227 Va. 569, 576-77, 318
S.E.2d 292, 296-97 (1984) (citations omitted); accord Jarvis v. Tonkin, 238 Va. 115,
121-22, 380 S.E.2d 900, 904 (1989); Morris v. United Virginia Bank, 237 Va. 331,
337-38, 377 S.E.2d 611, 614 (1989); Spence v. Griffin, 236 Va. 21, 27-28, 372 S.E.2d
595, 598 (1988); Seemann v. Seemann, 233 Va. 290, 293, 355 S.E.2d 884, 886 (1987);
Sprott v. Sprott, 233 Va. 238, 240, 355 S.E.2d 881, 882 (1987); Wells v. Weston, 229
Va. 72, 75, 326 S.E.2d 672, 674 (1985); Wiltshire v. Pollard, 220 Va. 678, 680, 261
S.E.2d 542, 543 (1980); Martinsville Bank v. Cobler, 215 Va. 852, 854, 213 S.E.2d
800, 802 (1975).
144. Firebaugh, 247 Va. at 525-26, 443 S.E.2d at 137 (citing H-B Partnership v.
Wimmer, 220 Va. 176, 179, 257 S.E.2d 770, 773 (1979)). The court stated that, as a
fiduciary, "a broker owes his principal the duty to use utmost fidelity to him and
must disclose to him all facts within the broker's knowledge which may be material
to the transaction, or which might influence the principal in deciding upon a course
of action." 247 Va. 519, 525-26, 443 S.E.2d 134, 137 (1994); see also Burruss v. Green
Auction Co., 228 Va. 6, 10, 319 S.E.2d 725, 727 (1984); accord Van Deusen v. Snead,
247 Va. 324, 330, 441 S.E.2d 207, 211 (1994); Va. Real Estate Comm. v. Bias, 226
Va. 264, 269, 308 S.E.2d 123, 125-26 (1983); Metro Realty v. Wollard, 223 Va. 92, 98,
286 S.E.2d 197, 200 (1982); Owen v. Shelton, 221 Va. 1051, 1054, 277 S.E.2d 189,
191 (1981); Duncan v. Barbour, 188 Va. 53, 61-62, 49 S.E.2d 260, 264 (1948); Mitchell
v. Hughes, 143 Va. 393, 403, 130 S.E. 225, 228 (1925).
145. Firebaugh, 247 Va. at 526, 443 S.E.2d at 137 (1994) (citing Hawks v. Sparks,
204 Va. 717, 720, 133 S.E.2d 536, 539 (1963)).
146. Id. at 526, 443 S.E.2d at 138. One exception, articulated in Walker v.
Henderson, 151 Va. 913, 927-28, 145 S.E. 311, 315 (1928), is that "he who asks equi-
ty must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands."
147. Firebaugh, 247 Va. at 527, 443 S.E.2d at 138.
148. Id. (citing McLean v. Hill, 185 Va. 346, 351, 38 S.E.2d 583, 586 (1946)).
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dence in the case of Van Deusen v. Snead. In a contract
executed fourteen days before the execution of the contract at
issue, the Sneads had agreed to sell their residence to a Mr.
and Mrs. Osmann.5 ° However, when a house investigation re-
vealed vertical deferential settlement, the Sneads released the
Osmanns from their contract.' 5' A contract between the Van
Deusens and the Sneads was executed a few weeks thereaf-
ter. '2 When the Van Deusens discovered the settlement de-
fects and the estimated cost of repairs, they filed a bill of com-
plaint against the Sneads, the Sneads' real estate agent, and
their own real estate agent.
As to the Van Deusens' fraud claim against the Sneads, the
court stated that a party alleging fraud must prove each ele-
ment of fraud by clear and convincing evidence.M Though the
Sneads argued that they made no false representation, the
court pointed out that concealment of a material fact may con-
stitute the element of misrepresentation and held that a cause
of action existed for fraud.
155
In considering the Sneads' demurrer to the negligence count,
the Supreme Court of Virginia was persuaded by the argument
that actual knowledge of the settlement problem raised no duty
under Virginia law for the Sneads to disclose the defects. Ab-
sent such a duty, there can be no breach and no cause of action
for negligence.'56 As to the demurrer filed by the listing
agents, the court affirmed the chancellor's ruling sustaining the
listing agent's demurrer to the four counts of the improper
149. 247 Va. 324, 441 S.E.2d 207 (1994).
150. Id. at 326, 441 S.E.2d at 208.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 327, 441 S.E.2d at 209.
153. Id.
154. Id. To prove fraud, one must show "(1) a false misrepresentation, (2) of a
material fact, (3) made intentionally and knowingly, (4) with intent to mislead, (5)
reliance by the party mislead, and (6) resulting damage to him." Id. (citing Thompson
v. Bacon, 245 Va. 107, 111, 425 S.E.2d 512, 514 (1993)).
155. Id. at 328, 441 S.E.2d at 209 (citing Spence v. Griffin, 236 Va. 21, 28, 372
S.E.2d 595, 598-99 (1988)). The court further stated that "concealment is an affirma-
tive act intended or known to be likely to keep another from learning of a fact of
which he would otherwise have learned. Such affirmative action is always equivalent
to a misrepresentation...." Id. at 329, 441 S.E.2d at 210 (citing RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 160 (1979)).
156. Id. at 330, 441 S.E.2d at 210.
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conduct set forth in the bill of complaint. 57 Finally, since
there was no evidence of verbal misrepresentation or other
action on behalf of the purchasers' agent, the court sustained
the demurrer filed by the purchasers' agent as to the fraud
count.
58
In Long Signature Homes, Inc. v. Fairfield Woods, Inc.,"
Fairfield Woods and Long Signature Homes entered into a
contract in which Fairfield agreed to develop and Long agreed
to buy 382 building lots in Fairfield's subdivision. The contract
provided that Long's obligation to proceed to closing was contin-
gent upon the existence of water, sewer and electric facilities of
adequate size and capacity to serve the 382 lots.' Long had
the option to waive the contingency or delay the date of closing
if Fairfield failed to satisfy the aforementioned contingency.' 6'
The parties were notified by letter that the sewer plant serving
the area was approaching its maximum treatment capacity and
that the county would provide sewer service up to the plant's
capacity on a "first-come-first-serve" basis.'62 The parties
closed on forty lots and were scheduled to close on ten more
lots when Fairfield wrote Long advising that the contract was
terminated for all lots beyond the ten lots scheduled to close
due to Fairfield's inability to meet the sewer contingency."
Long advised Fairfield, by letter, that only Long had termina-
tion rights under the contract, and the parties closed on the ten
lots." When Long wrote to Fairfield a year later asking for a
completion schedule for the development of the next lots in the
subdivision, Fairfield responded negatively, alleging impossibili-
ty of performance."
Relying on established contract principles, the Supreme Court
of Virginia noted that a supervening condition that renders a
promisor's performance temporarily impossible will not release
him from the duty of performing, but will only suspend that
157. Id. at 330, 441 S.E.2d at 210-11.
158. Id. at 332, 441 S.E.2d at 211.
159. 248 Va. 95, 445 S.E.2d 489 (1994).
160. Id. at 97, 445 S.E.2d at 490.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 97, 445 S.E.2d at 490-91.
163. Id. at 98, 445 S.E.2d at 491.
104. Id.
165. Id.
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obligation. 6 ' This rule is generally inapplicable and a
promisor's duty of performance is discharged rather than sus-
pended if the delay will make the promisor's performance mate-
rially more burdensome."' In this case, the court concluded
that Fairfield's duty to perform was not discharged by virtue of
being burdensome since the contract required Fairfield to per-
form even after the expiration of what would otherwise be a
reasonable time period." However, since the contract affected
the alienability of land and Fairfield was a corporation, the rule
against perpetuities mandated that Fairfield's obligation to
satisfy the contract contingencies and to convey the land cannot
extend beyond twenty-one years from the date of the
contract.16
In Brooks v. Bankson,' ° the Supreme Court of Virginia ex-
amined the trial court's interpretation of a contract provision
relating to the condition of a thirty-acre parcel. Rodney A.
Bankson and Patricia N. Bankson (Buyer) agreed to purchase
the parcel from Robert W. Brooks and Patricia M. Brooks (Sell-
er).' The property included a house constructed around 1895
which had been renovated in the early 1980's by the Seller. 2
The purchase price for the property was $245,000, of which
$5000 was to be paid with the contract and the balance to be
paid at closing. Paragraph 4 of the contract provided that the
$5000 deposit plus $19,500, for a total of $24,500, would be
"forfeited in the event of Buyer default" and paid directly to the
Seller.'73 Paragraph 8 of the contract consisted entirely of
preprinted language and was entitled "Risk of
Loss/Inspection/Walk Through.""'4 Two days before the sched-
166. Id. at 99, 445 S.E.2d at 491 (relying on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 269 (1981); 18 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 1957 (3d ed. 1978)).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 100, 445 S.E.2d at 492 (citing Ryland Group, Inc. v. Wills, 229 Va. 459,
463, 331 S.E.2d 399, 402 (1985) (holding that although parties to real estate develop-
ment contracts assume that their contracts will be performed within a commercially
reasonable time, this assumption may be modified by contract)).
170. 248 Va. 197, 445 S.E.2d 473 (1994).
171. Id. at 199, 445 S.E.2d at 474.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Paragraph 8 provided in material part:
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uled closing date, after conducting their "walk through" inspec-
tion of the property with an electrical engineer, the Buyer,
through an attorney, notified the Seller that the Buyer would
not purchase the property.' 5 The Seller filed suit against the
Buyer for breach of contract. 6
The trial court interpreted paragraph 8 of the contract "to
give the Buyers the right to conduct a further inspection on the
date of the 'walk through' before accepting the property.""
The Seller's attorney argued that such interpretation was incor-
rect, stating that the "walk through" was to compare the condi-
tion of the property on the date of the contract with its condi-
tion on the date of the "walk through."'7 Ultimately, the jury
returned a verdict in favor of the Buyer.' 9
The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with the Seller that
the trial court incorrectly construed paragraph 8 of the contract.
Because the contract was not made contingent upon the Buyer's
satisfaction with the "walk through" inspection, the court con-
cluded that the parties did not intend it to be a condition that
could void the contract. 80
The Buyer argued that the trial court erred in failing to
strike the Seller's evidence on the ground that the contract
provision for the payment of the $24,500 by the defaulting
party was unenforceable.' However, the Supreme Court of
Virginia agreed with the Seller that the provision for $24,500 in
damages did not constitute an unenforceable penalty since use
of the word "forfeited" was not determinative.' Observing the
All risk of loss or damage to the Property . . . is assumed by the Seller
until settlement. ... The Purchaser, by acknowledging this Contract,
represents that a satisfactory inspection has been made of the Property
and the Purchaser agrees to accept the Property in its present condition
except as may be otherwise provided. The Purchaser further has the
right to do a "walk through" inspection of the subject Property prior to
settlement to inspect the condition of the premises.
Id. at 200, 445 S.E.2d at 475.
175. Id. at 201, 445 S.E.2d at 475.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 202, 445 S.E.2d at 476.
178. Id. at 203, 445 S.E.2d at 476.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 205, 445 ,S.E.2d 477.
181. Id. at 207, 445 S.E.2d at 479.
182. Id. at 208, 445 S.E.2d at 479 (citing Taylor v. Sanders, 233 Va. 73, 75, 353
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difficulty in measuring the damages that might be sustained by
the Seller, the court confirmed that the damages provision was
intended as enforceable liquidated damages."
H. Tenancies
In Hoover v. Smith,' the Supreme Court of Virginia fo-
cused on the issue of whether a deed which conveyed a parcel
of land to grantees as "joint tenants and not as tenants in
common"5 5 created an estate with survivorship between the
joint tenants. The heirs of the first deceased of the two grant-
ees and the heirs of the survivor were the parties to the case.
The trial court held that the following language created an
estate with survivorship: "It is hereby mutually understood and
agreed that the grantees herein named are to have and to hold
the said land and tenements as joint tenants and not as ten-
ants in common."' However, the Supreme Court of Virginia
disagreed. The court noted that section 55-20... provides for
the abolition of survivorship between joint tenants,"8 subject
to the exception created by section 55-21... that "[Slection 55-
20 shall not apply to . . . an estate conveyed or devised to per-
sons in their own right when it manifestly appears from the
tenor of the instrument that it was intended that the part of
the one dying should then belong to the others."9 ' Applying
the definition of "manifest" in Black's Law Dictionary, 9' the
court concluded that nothing in the language of the deed estab-
S.E.2d 745, 747 (1987)). The Supreme Court in Taylor stated that the amount agreed
upon between the parties to a contract will be construed as enforceable liquidated
damages when the actual damages contemplated at the time of the agreement are
uncertain and difficult to determine. Taylor, 233 Va. at 75, 353 S.E.2d at 746-47.
183. Brooks, 248 Va. at 208, 445 S.E.2d at 479.
184. 248 Va. 6, 444 S.E.2d 546 (1994).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 7, 444 S.E.2d at 547.
187. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-20 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
188. Hoover, 248 Va. at 8, 444 S.E.2d at 547.
189. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-21 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
190. Hoover, 248 Va. at 9, 444 S.E.2d. at 548 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 55-21 (Repl.
Vol. 1995), (emphasis added)).
191. "[Mlanifest means obvious to the understanding, evident to the mind, not
obscure or hidden, and is synonymous with open, clear, visible, unmistakable, indubi-
table, indisputable, evident and self-evident." Id. at 10, 444 S.E.2d at 548 (citing
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 962 (6th ed. 1990)).
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lished an estate of survivorship and reversed the lower court's
decision."'
I. Trespass; Damages
In Hamilton Development Co. v. Broad Rock Club, Inc.,'93
the Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed a trespass for which
significant damages had been awarded during the trial. In an
effort to "round off" a subdivision lot in its development adja-
cent to land owned by Broad Rock Club, Hamilton Development
intentionally cleared and graded land belonging to Broad Rock
Club.' Compensatory damages of $20,000 and $200,000 in
punitive damages were awarded to Broad Rock Club as a result
of Hamilton's actions.'9 5  Evidence as to Hamilton
Development's financial condition the year of the trespass was
admitted and considered by the jury. Hamilton Development ap-
pealed the punitive damage award as excessive and also chal-
lenged the introduction of its financial records into evidence.'96
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the lower court in
every respect, including the admission of Hamilton
Development's financial records.9 7 The court then noted that
there was credible evidence in the record that the defendant
committed the trespass after receiving notice that Broad Rock
Club owned the land in question, and in disregard to that
192. Id.
193. 248 Va. 40, 445 S.E.2d 140 (1994).
194. Id. at 41, 445 S.E.2d at 141.
195. Id.
196. This evidence showed Hamilton Development's revenues in the year of tres-
pass to have been approximately $1.2 million, with some $679,160 having been dis-
tributed to its two principals. Id. at 46, 445 S.E.2d at 144.
197. Id. at 44, 445 S.E.2d at 143 (citing Weatherford v. Birchett, 158 Va. 741, 747,
164 S.E. 535, 537 (1932) (stating that evidence of the financial condition of a defen-
dant is relevant on the issue of punitive damages)).
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knowledge.' 9' Thus, punitive damages were found to have
been properly assessed.
J. Zoning
In Gwinn v. Collier,'99 the Supreme Court of Virginia con-
sidered whether Virginia Code section 15.1-496.1 requires a
zoning administrator to appeal his or her own decision to the
board of zoning appeals."' Norville N. Collier owned approxi-
mately two acres of land in an area zoned for residential use.
In 1981, the zoning administrator of Fairfax County issued a
non-residential use permit to Collier permitting the operation of
a "major vehicle establishment" as a non-conforming use on the
property.2 ' However, after nearly two years of operation, the
issuing administrator revoked the permit it had previously
issued because it had been erroneously issued and directed
Collier to cease operation of his business."2
Collier neither appealed the decision of the zoning adminis-
trator nor ceased operation of the business. As a result, the
198. Id. at 45, 445 S.E.2d at 143. Punitive damages may only be recovered when
the defendant acted with malice, misconduct, or such recklessness or negligence as to
constitute conscious disregard of the rights of others. Id. (citing Giant of Virginia, Inc.
v. Pigg, 207 Va. 679, 685, 152 S.E.2d 271, 277 (1967)); accord Puente v. Dickens, 245
Va. 217, 219, 427 S.E.2d 340, 342 (1993). The court also noted that the standard for
judicial review of punitive damages-leaving punitive damage awards undisturbed in
the absence of a conclusion that the award "shocked its conscience"-has been estab-
lished in its holdings in Philip Morris v. Emerson, 235 Va. 380, 414, 368 S.E.2d 268,
287 (1988); Modaber v. Kelley, 232 Va. 60, 348 S.E.2d 243 (1986). Hamilton Develop-
ment Co., 248 Va. at 46, 445 S.E.2d at 144.
199. 247 Va. 479, 443 S.E.2d 161 (1994).
200. Id. at 480, 443 S.E.2d at 161. Virginia Code § 15.1-496.1(A) states, in rele-
vant part:
an appeal to the board may be taken by any person aggrieved or by any
officer, department, board or bureau of the county or municipality affect-
ed by any decision of the zoning administrator or from any order, re-
quirement, decision or determination made by any other administrative
officer in the administration or enforcement of this article or any ordi-
nance adopted pursuant thereto. . . . Such appeal shall be taken within
thirty days after the decision appealed from by filing with the zoning
administrator, and with the board, a notice of appeal specifying the
grounds thereof...
VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-496.1(A) (Cure. Supp. 1995).
201. Gwinn, 247 Va. at 480, 443 S.E.2d at 161.
202. Id. at 480, 443 S.E.2d at 162.
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zoning administrator filed a bill of complaint for declaratory
judgment and injunctive relief against Collier. Collier, in turn,
filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that he had ob-
tained a non-residential use permit, and that the legality of his
use was not subject to attack because the zoning administrator
had not appealed her decision to issue the permit to the board
of zoning appeals."3
Though the trial court sided with Collier and entered judg-
ment on his behalf, the Supreme Court of Virginia dis-
agreed.2 The court opined that the General Assembly did not
intend for Virginia Code section 15.1-496.1 to require a zoning
administrator to appeal his or her decision to the board of zon-
ing appeals, describing such a construction of the code as creat-
ing "a manifest absurdity."' 5 The court further found no use-
ful purpose in requiring a zoning administrator to exhaust
administrative remedies or initiate proceedings that may result
in a judicial attack upon his or her own decision.0 ' The court,
therefore, concluded that Collier's purported entitlement to
operate a major vehicle service establishment in a residential
district was not an issue decided and could not be chal-
lenged.0 '
At issue on appeal in Board of Supervisors of Chesterfield
County v. Trollingwood Partnership,"' was whether a proper-
ty owner had acquired a vested right to develop his property
before the amendment of a zoning ordinance prohibiting his
proposed use of the property. Lloyd C. Journigan, Jr. purchased
an option to buy approximately 160 acres of agricultural land
with the intent of developing part of the land as a mobile home
park; however, before exercising his option, Journigan applied
to the Board of Supervisors of Chesterfield County (the Board)
203. Id. at 481, 443 S.E.2d at 162.
204. Id. at 482-83, 443 S.E.2d at 162-63.
205. Id. at 483, 443 S.E.2d at 163.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 484-85, 443 S.E.2d at 163-64; see, e.g., Gwinn v. Alward, 235 Va. 616,
621, 369 S.E.2d 410, 412 (1988) (holding that the zoning administrator's decision that
Alward operated a junk yard and parked operable trash trucks on his property in
violation of the zoning ordinance "was a thing decided and was not subject to attack
by [defendant] Alward . . . because [he] never appealed the various decisions in
which he was declared in violation of the zoning ordinance").
208. 248 Va. 112, 445 S.E.2d 151 (1994).
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for rezoning of the land from agricultural use to general busi-
ness use." 9 The property was subsequently rezoned to a gen-
eral business classification. Journigan submitted to the board of
zoning appeals a "first design proposal" of a 500-unit mobile
home park," upon which a special permit was granted "sub-
ject to the final site layout, landscaping and plans being ap-
proved by the planning director."21' In January 1971,
Journigan exercised his option and submitted plans to the coun-
ty for the first two phases of the park.' However, the county
zoning ordinance was amended in July of 1971 to preclude the
establishment of mobile home parks in general business dis-
tricts. In 1975, Journigan conveyed his interest in the property
to Trollingwood, a developer which planned to complete the
park by developing a third phase.2 ' Thereafter, Trollingwood,
having been informed that it had no vested right to expand the
park, applied for an amendment to the zoning ordinance which
was denied. However, in September 1988, the trial court held
that Trollingwood's right to expand the park to its 500-unit
capacity had vested under the May 1970 special use permit
issued to Journigan.214
The Supreme Court of Virginia overruled the lower court's
decision that the issuance of a use permit for the 500-unit park
created a vested right in Journigan and his successors to ex-
pand the park into the balance of the area shown on
Journigan's "first design proposal."' 5 TheL court noted that
Trollingwood's argument overlooked the provisions of the county
zoning ordinance which, at the time, required property owners
to submit detailed plans for "trailer parks," and further pointed
209. Id. at 113, 445 S.E.2d at 151. At the time of his application, mobile home
parks were permitted in general business districts subject to the grant of a special
use permit by the Board of Zoning Appeals. Id.
210. Id. The application included a plat showing the general layout of a gravity
flow sewage system and unscaled, schematic drawings of the proposed sewage
treatment plant for the park. Id.
211. Id. at 113-14, 445 S.E.2d at 152.
212. Phase I covered 134 units of the park while Phase H covered 172 units. Id.
at 114, 445 S.E.2d at 152.
213. Id. Journigan's detailed plans and the construction in progress on Phases I
and II were sufficient to give Journigan a vested right to complete those Phases in
1975. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 115-16, 445 S.E.2d at 152-53.
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out that Journigan did submit such plans for Phases I and II
in conformity with the ordinance.21
Because neither Journigan nor Trollingwood had filed a de-
tailed Phase HI site plan as required by both the ordinance and
the special use permit before the property was rezoned, the
court ultimately found that Trollingwood had no right to ex-
pand the park.21
The Supreme Court of Virginia also considered whether land-
owners had obtained a vested right to use their land in the
manner described by the terms of a zoning variance in Snow v.
Amherst City Board of Zoning Appeals.21 James and Mary
Snow sought to buy and develop for residential purposes a 3.76-
acre parcel located adjacent to a county watershed lake and a
conservation zone."9 However, a zoning ordinance prohibited
construction within 200 feet of the conservation zone, which
effectively precluded construction of a house on the proper-
ty.220 Before purchasing the property, the Snows applied to
the Board of Zoning Appeals of Amherst County (the BZA) for a
variance reducing the minimum setback requirements for the
property, and the variance was granted in 1989.221 The Snows,
in reliance on the variance, purchased the parcel, surveyed the
parcel, removed trees and undergrowth therefrom, and con-
structed a gravel road thereon.2 In 1991, the Board of Su-
pervisors amended the County's zoning and subdivision ordi-
nances to effectively prohibit construction of a residence any-
where on the parcel.2" The Snows requested a variance from
the 1991 zoning ordinance amendment, but the BZA denied the
request."
216. Id. at 115, 445 S.E.2d at 152-53. Journigan's detailed plans for Phases I and
II of the park were drawn to scale to show the precise locations of the streets, curbs,
gutters, and individual trailers. The plans also reflected detailed contours of the land
for grading and drainage, water and sewer connections on each lot, and sewer pro-
files. Id.
217. Id.
218. 248 Va. 404, 448 S.E.2d 606 (1994).
219. Id. at 405, 448 S.E.2d at 607.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 406, 448 S.E.2d at 607.
223. Id.
224. Id.
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The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected the Snows' contention
that a landowner may acquire a vested property right in a
particular land use merely by showing a significant official
governmental act and reliance thereon." Contrary to the
Snows' assertion, the court held that the grant of a variance is
not a significant official governmental act within the meaning
of its three-pronged test for determining vested rights.226 The
court instead characterized a variance as "simply an authorized
deviation from zoning requirements because of special charac-
teristics of a particular property."2 7 "The grant of a variance
cannot confer upon a landowner greater rights than could be
afforded by the enactment of a zoning ordinance."2"
The question presented to the Supreme Court of Virginia in
Kole v. City of Chesapeake229 was whether the trial court
erred in dismissing with prejudice several landowners' challenge
of the validity of a city's rezoning ordinance.230  The
225. Id. at 407, 448 S.E.2d at 608. A landowner who seeks to establish a vested
property right in a land use classification must show: 1) the issuance of a permit or
other approval authorizing the landowner to conduct a use on his property that other-
wise would not have been allowed, 2) the filing and diligent pursuit of a bona fide
site plan, and 3) incurrence of substantial expense, in good faith, before a change in
zoning. Id. (citing Board of Supervisors v. Medical Structures, Inc., 213 Va. 255, 192
S.E.2d 799 (1972) (county board of zoning appeals issued a special use permit upon
which successor to Medical Structures, Inc., expended $247,500 in development and
preparation of site plans)). This 3-pronged test has also been applied in Holland v.
Board of Supervisors, 247 Va. 286, 290, 441 S.E.2d 20, 22 (1994); Town of Stephens
City v. Russell, 241 Va. 160, 163, 399 S.E.2d 814, 815 (1991); Notestein v. Board of
Supervisors, 240 Va. 146, 151, 393 S.E.2d 205, 208 (1990); and Board of Supervisors
v. Cities Service Oil Co., 213 Va. 359, 362, 193 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1972).
226. Snow, 248 Va. at 408, 448 S.E.2d at 608. Justice Stephenson entered a dis-
sent stating that contrary to the majority's conclusion, he would hold that: 1) the
granting of a variance is a significant official governmental act and that the record
supports a finding, 2) the Snows diligently pursued the use authorized by the vari-
ance, and 3) the Snows incurred substantial expense in good faith prior to the zoning
amendments. Id. at 409, 448 S.E.2d at 609.
227. Id. at 408, 448 S.E.2d at 608.
228. Id.
229. 247 Va. 51, 439 S.E.2d 405 (1994).
230. The landowners specifically alleged that: (1) the City Council's action in re-
sponse to their application constituted unlawful "piecemeal down-zoning" and "spot
zoning;" (2) the City Council did not initiate the rezoning as required by law; (3) the
rezoning ordinance was void ab initio because the City Council failed to provide no-
tice, advertisement, and public hearing as required by statute; and (4) even if the
ordinance were valid, the City Council (a) violated the landowners' vested rights un-
der existing law, (b) violated their right to statutory and constitutional due process
and their constitutional right to equal protection, and (c) in effect, took their property
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landowners' claim was dismissed because their complaint was
not filed within thirty days of the enactment of the rezoning
ordinance,23' as required by Virginia Code section 15.1-
493(G). 2 The landowners owned several tracts in the city
that, prior to the contested rezoning, were zoned for residential
use. On February 13, 1991, in response to the planning
commission's recommendation, the city council voted to rezone
the tracts to a conservation zoning district.2 3 The landowners
contended that all viable economic uses for their property were
effectively prohibited in the conservation district.2"
In the City of Chesapeake, no ordinance can take effect or
exist until the referendum process is finished.2 3' While the
city council's decisions are subject to the process, "[t]he original
zoning... remains in place." 36 The Supreme Court of Virgin-
ia found that although the city council triggered the referendum
process set forth in the city charter in July of 1991, no final
zoning decision existed before the conclusion of such pro-
cess." Therefore, the city council's decision did not become
final and subject to judicial review until thirty days after the
council's action.'
In Foster v. Geller, 9 the Supreme Court of Virginia consid-
ered whether the trial court erred in holding that a board of
zoning appeals (BZA) director should not have permitted an
applicant to construct a residence on a substandard lot without
first obtaining a special use permit. The controversy arose when
without just compensation in violation of the United States and Virginia constitutions.
Id. at 53, 439 S.E.2d at 406.
231. Id. at 53-54, 439 S.E.2d at 406.
232. Virginia Code § 15.1-493(G) provides, in pertinent part, that "[e]very action
contesting a decision of the local government body. . . a proposed zoning ordinance
or amendment thereto . . . shall be filed within thirty days of such decision...
[hlowever, nothing in this subsection shall be construed to create any new right to
contest the action of a local governing body." VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-493)(G) (Cum.
Supp. 1995).
233. Kole, 247 Va. at 55, 439 S.E.2d at 407-08. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-493(G)
(Cum. Supp. 1995).
234. Id. at 55, 439 S.E.2d at 407.
235. Id. at 56, 439 S.E.2d at 408 (citing R.G. Moore Bldg. v. Committee, 239 Va.
484, 490, 391 S.E.2d 587, 590 (1990)).
236. Id. (citing Moore, 239 Va. at 490, 391 S.E.2d at 590).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. 248 Va. 563, 449 S.E.2d 802 (1994).
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Daniel D. Geller asked the Director of the Department of Plan-
ning and Community Development of the City of Alexandria
(the Director) to confirm that a residence could be built on a
9,000 square foot lot on terrain described as a ravine or gulch.
Applying the "fixed point measurement method"2" the Direc-
tor determined that the undeveloped lot did not meet the lot
width requirements at the building setback lines.24' However,
because the fixed point measurement method had not been
consistently applied in the past, the Director stated that he
would apply the fixed point measurement method prospectively
only and that the lot could be developed. 2 As a result of this
decision, several adjacent property owners appealed the
Director's decision to the BZA, alleging that the lot could not be
developed without a special use permit as required by the zon-
ing ordinance of the City of Alexandria.' The BZA sided with
the adjacent property owners and reversed the decision of the
Director.' The trial court subsequently reversed the BZA.245
The Supreme Court of Virginia pointed out that the
Director's conclusion that the lot did not meet the minimum lot
width requirements using the fixed point measurement method
brought the lot within the Ordinance provisions governing sub-
standard lots.2" Therefore, by authorizing construction on the
240. The fixed point measurement method requires that the minimum lot width be
met at both the minimum front yard setback line and the actual building line. Id. at
565, 449 S.E.2d at 804 n. 1. The more commonly used "floating location measurement
method" allows compliance with the minimum lot width at any setback line where
the building hypothetically could be built. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. Section 12-400 of the Ordinance sets out the procedure for obtaining a
special use permit. Section 12-401 prohibits the development of substandard lots with-
out first obtaining a special use permit. Substandard lots are those that do not meet
the minimum width requirements. Id. at 567, 449 S.E.2d at 805.
244. Id. at 565, 449 S.E.2d at 804.
245. Id. at 566, 449 S.E.2d at 804.
246. Id. at 567-68, 449 S.E.2d at 805. Section 12-405 of the Ordinance provides
that:
[f]rom and after September 16, 1989, the remedy and procedure provided
in this Section 12-400 shall be [the] exclusive remedy and procedure for
the use and development of substandard lots in the zones herein desig-
nated, and any use or development of such lots in a manner not herein
provided for and authorized shall be conclusively presumed to be contrary
to the public interest and contrary to the intended spirit and purpose of
this ordinance.
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lot, the Director allowed its development without following the
required special use permit procedure required by the ordi-
nance.' The court further opined that the effect of the
Director's decision to circumvent the special use permit process
was to alter the provisions of the ordinance by imposing a new
effective date for the special use permit requirement.2" There-
fore, the BZA's determination that the Director could not take
action contradicting another provision of the ordinance was
correct. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the
trial court and entered final judgment in favor of the BZA and
the adjacent property owners. 9
II. LEGISLATION
A. Certificates and Forms
The form of a Certificate of Transfer and a Certificate of
Assignment have been combined into a single Certificate of
Transfer which accomplishes both purposes, pursuant to the
newly amended and reenacted section 55-66.01." ° Upon recor-
dation, the Certificate of Transfer shall also operate as notice of
an assignment."' The permissible form for Certificates of Sat-
isfaction and Partial Satisfaction have also been slightly modi-
fied, as set forth in Virginia Code section 55.66.4:1.252
B. Costs
The charge for remote access to court records will now be
established by the county, city, or town agency which provides
the computer support.2" The newly amended section 14.1-
Id. at 567, 449 S.E.2d at 805.
247. Id. at 568, 449 S.E.2d at 805.
248. Id. at 569-70, 449 S.E.2d at 806. See id. at 568 (stating that neither the BZA
nor the director possesses the power to amend or repeal portions of zoning ordinanc-
es) (citing Belle-Haven Citizens Association v. Schumann, 201 Va. 36, 41-42, 109
S.E.2d 139, 143 (1959)).
249. Id. at 570, 449 S.E.2d at 807.
250. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-66.01 (Cum. Supp. 1995).
251. Id.
252. Id. § 55-66.4:1.
253. VA. CODE ANN. § 14.1-118.1 (Cum. Supp. 1995).
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118.1 mandates, however, that such fees be used to cover the
operational expenses of these computer systems.' A user
may also be charged a fee of up to $25 per month for connect
time.25
5
C. Dedication
Easements for storm water, domestic water and sewage may
now be transferred to the county or municipality, or to such
association or public authority as the county or municipality
may provide, by the recordation of a plat rather than by deed
of dedication."6 The county, municipality, association or au-
thority to whom an easement is granted shall not be obligated
to install or maintain such facilities, however, unless otherwise
agreed to by the benefitted entity. 7
D. Deeds and Recordation
The newly amended and reenacted section 58.1-81125 now
provides that no recordation tax is required on deeds of gift
between grantors and grantees, whether they are individuals or
not, as was previously required to receive the exemption. 9
However, future and contingent beneficiaries are now excluded
from the recordation tax exemption for deeds conveying real
estate to trustees of an irrevocable inter vivos trust when the
grantor is also a beneficiary of the trust.26
Virginia Code section 14.1-112 now allows clerks of circuit
courts to collect a thirteen dollar fee for filing plat sheets too
large to file in the deed books. 261' This fee shall be in addition
to the fee for recording a deed or other instrument recorded in
conjunction with such plat sheet or sheets.262 There shall be
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-478 (Cure. Supp. 1995).
257. Id.
258. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-811 (Cum. Supp. 1995).
259. However, this does not require that a consideration pass between the parties.
260. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-811(A)(12) (Cum. Supp. 1995).
261. VA. CODE ANN. § 14.1-112(2) (Cum. Supp. 1995).
262. Id.
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no charge, however, to provide an attested copy of a court order
or decree to a party other than a copying fee of fifty cents per
page.
26
The relevant comments reveal that all sections of the Code
which deal with persons subject to the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice were amended to validate acknowledgments by
such persons taken prior to July 1, 19 9 5 .2" These acknowl-
edgments were last validated in 1989.
E. Environmental
2l
Two new sections related to voluntary environmental assess-
ment have been added to Title 10.1 of the Virginia Code. First,
section 10.1-1198 creates a privilege for information generated
from a voluntary environmental assessment and accords immu-
nity from administrative, criminal or civil penalties to those
who voluntarily disclose a violation of an environmental statute,
regulation, permit or administrative order.266
Additionally, three sections have been added to Title 10.1,
which relate to voluntary remediation of hazardous substances.
Section 10.1-1429.1 directs the Department of Environmental
Quality (DEQ) to promulgate regulations allowing persons who
own, operate, have a security interest in or enter into a con-
tract for the purchase of contaminated property to voluntarily
remediate releases of hazardous substances, hazardous waste,
solid waste or petroleum." ' This section is applicable in those
situations where remediation has not already been mandated by
263. Id. § 14.1-112(10).
264. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-114.1, -115, -123, -125, -125.1, -127, -129, -130, -131, -
32, -134, -134.1, -134.2, -135, -137.1, 137.2 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
265. Further discussions of recent environmental law developments can be found in
Brian L. Buniva & James R. Kibler, Jr., Annual Survey of Virginia Law:
Environmental Law, 29 U. RICH L. REv. 1053 (1995).
266. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1198 (Cunm. Supp. 1995). Environmental assessment is
defined in this section as "[a]n evaluation of activities or facilities . . . that is de-
signed to identify non-compliance and promote compliance with environmental laws
and regulations, or identify opportunities for improved efficiency or pollution preven-
tion." Id, § 10.1-1198(A). The definition of "document" privilege reveals that this does
not extend to information demonstrating a clear, imminent and substantial danger to
the public health or the environment or information otherwise required to be re-
ported. Id.
267. Id. § 10.1-1429.1.
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the DEQ, the Environmental Protection Agency or a court.2 8
The regulations, effective on July 1, 1997, will establish certain
remediation standards and procedures, as well as certifications
of satisfactory completion of remediation.269
The General Assembly also enacted legislation relating to the
management of ungranted shores of the sea, marsh, and mead-
owlands of the Commonwealth, assigning the management
responsibilities for same to the Virginia Marine Resources Com-
mission (VMRC).27 ' The new legislation requires the VMRC to
prepare a management plan for these lands and directs the
VMRC to prepare and file inventories identifying these lands on
the Eastern Shore that are owned by the Commonwealth. 7' A
procedure has also been established for amending the invento-
ries whenever any party to a land conveyance requests a deter-
nuination of whether land to be transferred belongs to the Com-
monwealth. 2
F. Insurance
2 73
New Virginia Code section 6.1-2.9:6 prohibits any person
from canceling an insurance policy protecting property at the
time of a refinancing, solely to change the effective dates of
coverage under the policy. 274 However, the section does permit
a lender to request a new policy when the coverage under the
existing policy is inadequate, or there is reasonable concern
over the soundness or the services of the insurer.
G. Landlord and Tenant
Section 55-248.38:1 clarifies the statutory procedures to be
followed by a landlord in cases where items of personal proper-
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 28.2-1500 to -1514 (Cure. Supp. 1995).
271. Id. § 28.2-1504.
272. Id. § 28.2-1506.
273. For further discussions of recent developments in insurance law in Virginia,
see E. Lewis Kincer, Jr., Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Insurance Law, 29 U. RICH.
L. REv. 1089 (1995).
274. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-2.9:6 (Cum. Supp. 1995).
275. Id.
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ty have been abandoned by a tenant following the termination
of a rental agreement. 76 These procedures do not apply, how-
ever, if the landlord has been granted a writ of possession for
the premises, and the execution of such writ has been complet-
ed in accordance with section 8.01-470.27 ' On a related note,
landlords are now required to provide written notice to tenants
forty-eight hours prior to applying a pesticide inside or outside
of a tenant's dwelling unit unless the tenant has requested
application of the pesticide. 8
New section 8.01-127.1 of the Virginia Code provides for the
removal of residential unlawful detainer actions to the circuit
court under certain circumstances. 29 Expedited hearings are
provided for in section 55-248.31 where, under the Virginia
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, a breach of the tenant's
obligations of the rental agreement involves a criminal or will-
ful act which is not remediable, and which poses a threat to
the health or safety of the particular tenant or any other ten-
ants. If successful, the landlord may terminate the rental
agreement immediately and proceed to obtain possession of the
premises within fifteen days from service on the tenant in vio-
lation.2"'
H. Lending
Section 6.1-330.72 provides that any lender making a loan
secured by a subordinate mortgage or deed of trust may now
require the borrower to pay the actual cost of a credit report in
addition to costs for a title examination, title insurance, mort-
gage guaranty insurance, recording fees, surveys, attorneys' fees
and appraisal fees.282
276. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.38:1 (Cum. Supp. 1995).
277. Id.
278. Id. § 55-248.18.
279. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-127.1 (Cum. Supp. 1995).
280. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.31 (Cum. Supp. 1995).
281. Id.
282. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.72 (Cum. Supp. 1995).
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I. Local Government
Section 22.1-129 authorizes school boards to sell surplus real
property and to retain all or a portion of the proceeds of such
sales in capital improvement funds.2" Such sales must follow
approval by the local governing body and a public hearing on
the sale and retention of the proceeds." Any retained pro-
ceeds would be used for school renovations, major school main-
tenance projects, and new school construction.' The authority
granted by this section is permissive, allowing school boards
also to convey such property to the local governing body."8
Section 15.1-458 of the Code gives localities the opportunity
to acquire property designated on an official map for future
construction of public works.287 It is important to note that an
application for a building permit will not restrict a locality from
condemning a piece of property.2"
J. Performance Guaranties
Virginia Code section 15.1-466 has been amended to provide
that the administrative costs that may be added to the con-
struction cost to determine the total amount of a performance
guaranty shall not exceed twenty-five percent of the estimated
construction costs. 89 In addition, all bonds, payments, cash
escrows or other performance guarantees under section 15.1-466
of the Virginia Code must be returned, with interest, as a tax
credit against the real estate taxes on the property, if construc-
tion of the facilities identified in the established water, sewer
and drainage programs was not commenced within twelve years
from the date of the posting of the performance guaranty.29
Furthermore, the cumulative partial releases of performance
guarantees that localities must make have been increased from
283. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-129 (Cum. Supp. 1995).
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. VA. CODE ANN. 15.1-458 (Cum. Supp. 1995).
288. Id.
289. Id. § 15.1-466.
290. Id.
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eighty percent to ninety percent with the recent amendment of
section 15.1-466(A)(14). 291
Local governing bodies are now authorized to appoint admin-
istrative agencies to approve sureties and bonds required of
land developers in regard to construction of roads and other
public improvements, in place of the governing body's actual
approval.
292
K. Streets and Highways
The Commonwealth Transportation Board is now authorized
under Virginia Code section 46.2-809.1 to develop a traffic poli-
cy and procedure for the control of residential cut-through traf-
fic on designated secondary highways.2 13 Cut-through traffic
shall include vehicular traffic passing through a residential
area without stopping or without, at least, an origin or a desti-
nation within the area.294
L. Taxation
Local administrative officials are now entitled to correct local
tax assessments by refunding a taxpayer up to $2,500 for an
erroneous assessment.2 9 5 In addition, section 58.1-3980 of the
Virginia Code relating to the statute of limitations for the cor-
rection and voluntary extension of local taxes has been expand-
ed. 296
M. Urban Blight
Spot blight abatement authority has been extended to coun-
ties, cities and towns which do not have housing authorities
pursuant to the amended and reenacted sections 36-49.1:1 and
36-105 of the Virginia Code.2 97 Furthermore, the requirement
291. Id. § 15.1-466(A)(14).
292. Id. § 15.1-466(A)(5).
293. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-809.1 (Cum. Supp. 1995).
294. Id.
295. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3981 (Cum. Supp. 1995).
296. Id. § 58.1-3980.
297. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 36-49.1:1, 36-105 (Cum. Supp. 1995).
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that a property be vacant before being declared blighted has
been removed from the sections.29 If blighted property is oc-
cupied for personal residential purposes, the governing body, in
approving a plan, shall not allow the acquisition of such proper-
ty if it would result in a displacement of person or persons
living on the premises.299
Furthermore, in an effort to locate absentee landlords whose
properties fall into decay and disrepair, section 58.1-3301 now
requires that all land books contain the names and street ad-
dresses of owners of real property in the local jurisdiction in
which the book is kept. 00 In cases where real property is
owned by more than one person, the land book shall contain
the name and street address of at least one of the owners.3 'O
N. Virginia Property Owners' Association Act
Provisions are made for the disbursement of an award when
any portion of the common area is taken or damaged by emi-
nent domain in new Virginia Code section 55-516.2.302 The
section also authorizes an association's board of directors to
negotiate with the condemning authority and bind the associa-
tion as to any award amount. °30 Section 55-512 was amended
to clarify that the disclosure requirements of the act apply only
to a person buying a lot for his residence, not to sales of lots to
builders or others purchasing lots for resale.3 A statement in
the sales contract that the purchaser is not purchasing the lot
for residential purposes shall be conclusive and may be relied
upon by the seller of the lot.30 5
298. Id.
299. Id. § 36-49.1:1(G).
300. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3301(C) (Cure. Supp. 1995).
301. Id.
302. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-516.2 (Cum. Supp. 1995).
303. Id.
304. Id. § 55-512.
305. Id.
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0. Zoning
Virginia Code sections 15.1-430 and 15.1-491, pertaining to
local government's regulation of land use and zoning, now pro-
vide that conditions imposed in granting special use permits for
affordable housing will be consistent with the objective of pro-
viding affordable housing."0 6 Definitions are set forth which
define "affordable housing", but each locality is authorized to
use its own definition.0 7
The minimum width requirement for manufactured homes
which may be placed in agricultural districts or districts having
similar classifications was eliminated in Virginia Code section15.1-486.4. 3's
Section 15.1-491 was amended to increase the powers and
duties of a zoning administrator, as set forth in the zoning
ordinance, to authorize the administrator, under certain con-
ditions, to grant variances to zoning ordinances.3 O' In amend-
ing section 15.1-496.1 of the Code, the General Assembly pro-
vided that after a sixty-day period from a decision of the zoning
administrator or other administrative officer, such decision will
not be changed unless the decision was obtained through mal-
feasance or fraud.31 However, if the attorney for the govern-
ing body concurs, the sixty-day period will not apply to cor-
recting clerical or other non-discretionary errors. 1'
IV. CONCLUSION
Virginia practitioners should familiarize themselves with the
cases decided over the past year. Recent decisions of the Su-
preme Court of Virginia reflect the court's tendency to rely
upon established principles of law in reaching its decisions.
306. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-430, -491 (Cum. Supp. 1995).
307. Id.
308. Id. § 15.1-486.4.
309. Id. § 15.1-491.
310. Id. § 15.1-496.1.
311. Id.
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Moreover, the General Assembly's activity in the areas of
environmental remediation, spot blight abatement and zoning
strongly suggests efforts to promote responsible development
and enhancement of the quality of life of the Commonwealth's
citizens.
